Legislation by unknown
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 5 Issue 1 Article 9 
1936 
Legislation 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Legislation, 5 Fordham L. Rev. 125 (1936). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol5/iss1/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
LEGISLATION
LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION IN LABOR DIspuTE.-The rapid advancement
and manifold ramifications of industrial efficiency during the last four decades
have given rise to many socio-legal problems which favorable economic condi-
tions have long beclouded2" Whereas the recent and still vivid slump has
further emphasized the need for immediate and counteracting legislation,
labor disputes, a product of the industrial revolution, have long presented a
problem difficult of satisfactory solution. Whether the enactment of the
Norris-LaGuardia anti-injunction bill2 and similar laws in twenty-one statess
since 1931 will prove to be the Magna Carta of labor is a question that only
time can answer.
Historical Background of the Legislation
The evolution of the labpr groups is traceable directly to the peculiar
nature of the factory system. Before the advent of machinery, producing
units were exceedingly small. The personal contact of the few employees
with their employers encouraged the settlement of any element of dissatisfac-
tion. With the increase in mechanization came larger factoriesu and the ten-
dency to deal with employees collectively. The personal relationship gradu-
ally disappeared and workers found themselves regarded merely from the
1. SmAc=, TnE CO=aG SmuGGrm roR PowER (1931) pzsSim.
2. 47 STAr. 70 et seq., 29 U. S. C. A. § 101 et seq. (1932). For a discussion of the
Act see Legis. (1933) 21 Gxo. L. J. 344; Norris, Inhunctions in Labor Disputes (1932) 16
MARQUTrE L. REY. 157.
3 See notes 63, 70, 71, 88, 96, 98, 99, 102, 105, 107, 109, 111 infra, for a list of the
statutes.
4. YODER, LABOR ECOXOnCS AND LABOR PROBLMMs (Ist ed. 1933) 79, attributes the
widening of the chasm between owner and workers to the factory system. The process
of depersonalization has advanced to such an extent that workers and owners seldom
meet. The latter are interested only in dividends and their administrative agents are
compelled, above all, to make the business pay.
The importance of corporate enterprise in the United States, in this respect, lies in the
fact that in 1919 it paid 867 of all wages of industry although owning but 31.55 of
total business property. PATTERSoN, THE Woarw's Ecomonc DxmzairA (lt ed. 1930)
287.
5. The increased acceleration in industrial progress since 1850 may be gleaned from
a compilation in PATrERsoN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 72, 286:
All Manufacturing Industries
1850 1914 1920
Average number of employees 7.7 25.5 31.3
Average amount invested in each plant $4,330.00 $82,602.00 $153,200.40
Average value of product of each plant $8,280.00 $37,916.00 $215,100.00
In 1869 the average worker had at his command 1.14 horsepower. This figure rose to
1.9 in 1899, 4.65 in 1927 and 5.4 in 1933. Using 1914 as a base of 10D the man-hour
productivity of labor increased from 39 in 1889 to 183 in 1927. YODE, Op. cit. supra note
4, at 136-138.
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aspect of their industrial productivity.6 It was a natural consequence that
they banded together to offset the burdens thus placed upon them. The
strength of the trade groups soon assumed such consequence in England that
employer groups persuaded Parliament to pass a series of acts known as the
Combination Acts which limited the freedom of these unions. As a result
trade-unionism was an illegal activity at the turn of the nineteenth century. 8
But this did not lessen the need for the maintenance of the workers' strongest
form of expression and strikes continued. Such continued illegal activity gave
rise to the practice of prosecuting labor leaders for conspiracy.
In 1825 Parliament reversed its trend because of the growing strength of
the working class expressly recognizing the right of trade unions to bargain
collectively and to strike.9 Although the common law doctrine of conspiracy
persisted, the history of legislation in England shows a process of slowly relax-
ing limitations occurring at intervals throughout the latter half of the nine-
teenth century and the first part of this one. 10
This gradually liberating trend is notably lacking from the American scene,
however. State statutes purporting to give the unionist freedom occurred
sporadically and the federal government enacted such remedial legislation
on few occasions." The first laws directly pertaining to the freedom of the
worker were restrictive. For example, as early as 1630 a Massachusetts statute
limited the compensation that could be demanded by artisans. 12
Although dissatisfaction was undoubtedly prevalent before 1776 no strike
occurred until that year. It was, however, a spontaneous walkout of dis-
gruntled workers rather than the result of a plan of cooperating unionists.Y'
Modern labor organization was not begun until the latter part of the cen-
6. "After the industrial revolution, the typical worker was no longer able to set his
pace and adjust his effort to personal emotional or physical conditions. He became almost
inalienably attached to a machine. Workers were able to participate profitably only when
and to the extent that they affected an efficient cooperation between themselves and power
machinery." YODER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 75-76.
7. SEmMAN, THE YELLOW Dor, CoNTRAcT (1933) 12, places the appearance of the first
modem union in England in the early 18th century.
8. SEin.m , op. cit. supra note 7, at 12, 13; YODER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 472-474,
both discuss the conditions giving rise to the passage of the English Acts: 39 GEO. III, c.
81 (1799), and 39 & 40 Gme. III, c. 60 (1799 and 1800) made all combinations unlawful.
9. 5 GEe. IV, c. 95 (1824) recognized the legality of trade societies and 6 Gzo. IV, c.
129 (1825) expressly established the right to bargain collectively and to strike.
10. YODER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 474-475.
11. Although Congress has legislated on numerous occasions with a purpose to aid
labor in particular fields, there are but two outstanding acts intended for general applica-
tion: The Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 731, 737, 738 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 17 (1927), 28
U. S. C. A. §§ 381-387 (1928) which was designed to limit the use of the injunction in labor
disputes and provide jury trials in contempt cases; and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT.
70-73, 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 101-112 (1934).
12. WoLL, LABOR, INDUsTRY AND GOvERNMENT (1935) 1, relates that labor was so strong
by 1630 that the governor of the colony decreed that, "carpenters, joyners, bricklayers,
sawers and thatchers shall not take above 2 shillings a day nor any man shall give more."
But three years later the colony also curbed merchants.
13. BERNE= AND VAN DOREN, LABOR AND THE GOVERNMENT (1935) 13.
[Vol. 5
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tury.14 Thereafter, as in England, the coordinated efforts of workers were
met by prosecutions for conspiracyr These conspiracy charges were, how-
ever, comparatively unsuccessful and after the case of Commonwealth v.
Hunt1 6 which established the legality of the union, were seldom used to stem
the tide of labor activity.1 7 For a period of about twenty years thereafter
employers rarely attempted to obtain relief by prosecutions for conspiracy. 8
It is said that during this comparatively peaceful interval the basis for the
modem injunction was formulated out of the doctrine that both groups
enjoyed freedom within certain determinate limits 10
14. YoDER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 406. Although a shoemakers' guild was in existence
in Massachusetts as early as 1648, formation of the present type of workers' asociations
was not begun until 1792. The early societies placed more emphasis upon social advantages
rather than upon matters concerning wages, hours and working conditions. It was not
until 1827, following a strike for a 10-hour day, that the first city central council vs
formed which de-emphasized the social aspect of the organization. Id. at 406, 407.
15. Nelles, Commonwealth v. Hunt (1932) 32 Cor. L. REv. 1166-1169 gives a short
summary of the 20 prosecutions for conspiracy occurring before 1842. For a dicusion of
these early cases see Witte, Early American Labor Cases (1926) 35 Y=rn L. J. 825.
The cases discussed by Neles, supra, involved a comparatively small number of workers
but in Mopuso-q AsvD COMIAGER, TBE GROWM or THE Ai zc.z REPWunuc (1930) 393, it
is observed that in 1837 "strikes became frequent, and on several occasions included not
only the organized workers but the unskilled laborers of an entire city."
16. 45 Mass. 111 (1842). This was the first case clearly distinguishing between the
per se illegality of unions and the illegality of their acts. In none of the early cases was a
single workman jailed. Nelles, loc. cit. supra note 15, at 1163.
17. Beginning with 1869, conspiracy statutes directed expresly against labor were re-
pealed. Witte, loc. cit. supra note 15, at 829. A number of jurisdictions have since de-
dared that acts which a single person may legally do are not illegal if planned or accom-
plished by two or more persons. Among them are C.L. Gra,. LAws (Deering, 1931) Act
1605, § 1 (enacted 1903); CoLo. ComrP. STAT. (1921) § 4150 (enacted 1889); Nlmv. Cosxp.
LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) § 10482 (enacted 1912); N. J. Co'm. ST.r. (1911) tit. 9, § 128
(enacted 1883); OlA.- STAT. AmnN. (Harlow, 1931) § 10878 (enacted 1903); Omn. CoDE
AN. (1930) § 49-905 (enacted 1919). But in 1919 UTm REv. STAT. A.. (1933) § 49-2-S
declared patrolling, persuading and urging a boycott a crime. Among states expressly
recognizing the legality of the labor union are Mnm'e. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 425S (en-
acted 1917) ; PA. STAT. Ai-Nn. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 43 § 191 (enacted 1869); UTAiU Rav. SrAT.
ANN. (1933) § 49-2-1 (enacted 1917).
Such conspiracy charges have been termed "a dragnet of vague charges to catch innocent
persons, who in times of excitement may be convicted by the suspicions and prejudices of
juries." And that "they are not in harmony with the genius of a free people, living under
a written constitution." State v. Van Pelt, 136 N. C. 633, 641, 49 S. E. 177, 180 (1904).
18. Witte, loc. cit. supra note 15, at 829, n. 18, finds mention of only three labor cases
in the newspapers during that period.
19. In Nelles, loc. cit. supra note 15, at 1163, 1129, it is said that the basic principle
upon which the later injunction doctrine was premised, namely, that freedom is absolute
and has a determinable boundary wall which is the equal freedom of others, "sharpened its
teeth" during this period when employers were putting up with the labor unions. That the
modern injunction may have been an outgrowth of the early railroad receivership labor
troubles has also been suggested in Nelles, A Strike And Its Legal Consequences-A.n Ex-
amination of the Receivership Precedent For the Labor Injunction (1931) 40 YAr.= L. J.
507.
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As a natural result of the growing threat of union influence the employers
next sought to condition employment upon an agreement that the employee
dissociate himself from the trade union.20 Such a promise came to be popu-
larly known as a yellow dog contract. The exact time of its appearance in
this country is not definitely known, one writer placing it as early as 1820,21
another as late as 1870.22 However, its invention is attributed to the English
who discarded it long before it was popularized in the United States.
2
Despite the precedent established by Lumley v. Gye24 no attempt was made
by English courts to enforce the agreement. It remained for the courts in
this country to extend the doctrine of that case to cover breaches of anti-
union promises.25 Their hampering effect was soon brought to the attention
of the law-making bodies bf many states and as a concession to labor's strength
at the polls nineteen jurisdictions, led by New York in 1887, declared the
making of such contracts criminal.26 These laws were consistently held vio-
lative of the due process clause, the later cases relying wholly on United States
v. Adair27 which revoked a similar federal statute28 and Coppage v. Kansas 2
which construed a state statute.
A.-Injunctions
Another established method of obtaining relief by employers has been
20. The suggestion is that of S o~am , op. cit. supra note 7, at 12.
21. WouL, op. cit. supra note 12, at 76.
22. SEm DAN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 16.
23. The yellow dog contract achieved prominence in an English dispute In 1833. Its
vigorous execution completely wrecked a union of half a million workers. In 1859 after
24,000 members of a building trades union who had signed the document and maintained
their membership won a strike, little was heard of the subsequent use of the contract.
SEmm,, op. cit. supra note 7, at 13, 14.
At pp. 16-18 the author reports the first known use of the yellow dog contract by the
Western Union Tel. Co. in 1870 and its increasing popularity as registered by the large
number of employers using it throughout the 1870's.
24. 2 E. & B. 216, 118 Eng. Reprints 749 (Q. B. 1853), held that the malicious pro-
curement of the breach of a contract of employment was a tortious act.
25. SEIm AN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 14.
26. The laws and the year of their enactments were: CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1931)
§ 679 (1893) ; CoLO. Comip. STAT. (1921) §§ 4151, 4152 (1897), § 4353 (1911) ; CONN. GEN.
STAT. (1930) § 6209 (1918) IDAHO CODE ANN. (1930) § 43-601 (1893); ILL. RV. STAT.
(Hurd, 1899) c. 48, § 32 (1893); IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1926) § 2995 (1893); Kan, Laws
1897, c. 120; MAss. ANN. LAWS (Lawyers Co-op., 1933) c. 149, §§ 20, 180 (1892); MINN.
STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 10378 (1905); Mo. Laws 1893, p. 187; NEv. Coup. LAWS (Hlilyer,
1929) § 10473 (1912); N. H. PuB. LAWS (1926) c. 176, §§ 29, 30 (1913); N. J. Coin'.
STAT. (1911) tit. 9, §§ 129, 130, 131 (1894); N. Y. PENAL LAW (1887) § 531 (1887); Onro
GEN. CODE (Page, 1931) § 12943; OxrA. Coin,. LAWS (1909) § 4041; ORE. CODE ANN.
(1930) § 14-885 (1903) ; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 18, § 1299 (1897) ; Wis. Laws
1899, c. 332.
27. 208 U. S. 161 (1908).
28. The Erdman Act, 30 STAT. 424, c. 370 (1898).
29. 236 U. S. 1 (1915). For a list of decisions in state courts invalidating the state acts
see note 48, infra.
through the medium of equity decrees." The use of the injunction as a weapon
in industrial disputes is a characteristic development of equity jurisprudence in
the United States. The few cases in which it was employed in labor contro-
versies in England did not meet with approval.
31 Beginning with 188832
when an injunction was granted by a Massachusetts court"3 restricting the
activities of a union during a labor dispute this mode of judicial interference
became an increasingly popular weapon of employers.P
Equity has from its inception relieved many who were denied an adequate
remedy at law.33 A necessary prerequisite to the exercise of equitable juris-
diction over acts which are merely imminent is the danger of irreparable
damage.3 6 Irreparable damage ordinarily is suffered in every labor dis-
turbance. Thus it was under this theory that the court undertook active
participation when called upon to do so by the employer. T Continued
picketing became subject to its jurisdiction because of the accompanying
damage that necessarily flows from the unfavorable publicity which attaches
to most labor disputes.38
30. According to FREY, THE LABOR IzjUI.Crzox (1922) 29, practically everything at-
tempted by unionists to preserve their organizations from acts of employers seeking to
destroy them has been restrained by the courts.
31. Nelles, loc. cit. supra note 19, at 507-508, reports the first labor injunction was
granted in England in 1868. F=ny, op. cit. supra note 30, at 20-25, declares that the two
cases (Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551 [1868] and Taff-Vale R. Co. v.
A]malgamated Soc. of R. Servants, [1901] A. C. 426) in which injunctions were first
granted in labor disputes were respectively repudiated and reversed. In a criticism of this
book, Chaffee, Book Review (1923) 36 HARv. L. REv. 504, n. 1, points out that the first
case was attacked because it enjoined a libel and the second because it treated the union
as an entity. Resentment against the latter case was expre-ed in the enactment of the
TRADE DISPUTES ACr, 6 EDW. VII, c. 47 (1906), which did not prohibit the u.e of the
labor injunction but narrowed the tort liability of unions. The reviewer concludes, at p.
0;, that "no reliance can be placed on the theoretical discusison" of the book.
32. The first injunction in a labor dispute in the United States may have been granted
earlier. One labor authority states that the first decree was made in 1884. Worm,, op. cit.
supra note 12, at 137.
33. The first recorded injunction granted in a labor case was that decreed in Sherry v.
Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307 (1888), which was based upon Walker v. Cronin, 107
Mass. 555 (1871). The latter case held that a tort action was maintainable against the
defendant who induced workers under contract to plaintiff to leave his employ. The court
cited as authority Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551 (1863), cited note 31,
supra .
34. In Appendix I of FRAN-IURTER AND GaEZ.E, TaE L.0noR LDuWmcrso:; (1930) the
authors have compiled 118 cases in federal courts in which relief against the activities of
employees or trade-unions was sought. Injunctions were granted in 100 of the cases.
35. 1 Poar aoy, EQ rT JuRispRUDENcE (4th ed. 1918) § 132.
36. 4 id. § 1357.
37. In Crouch v. Central Labor Council of Portland, 134 Ore. 612, 293 Pac. 729 (1930),
equitable intervention was held proper because the damage was not capable of ascertain-
ment, the amount of damage not being a controlling element.
38. Picketing, of itself, has been held unlawful in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.
v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582 (C. C. S. D. Iowa 1905) (picketing continued for a year cannot be
justified on ground that its purpose is to persuade workmen to quit) ; Local Union, etc., v.
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The sweeping character of some injunctions often granted ex parte has
been the subject of much adverse criticism.3 9 The necessity and value of
courts of equity as such are recognized by labor groups but it is the abuse
Stathakis, 135 Ark. 86, 205 S. W. 450 (1918) (no physical intimidation but court held
customers would be constrained not to patronize); Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, etc., 156
Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324 (1909) (boycott held tending to impair constitutional rights of un-
attached workmen); A. R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical Union,' etc., 232 Ill.
424, 83 N. E. 940 (1908) (acts were innocent but enjoined because the aim to force union
agreement on plaintiff was malicious); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077
(1896) (even though workmen sought to be influenced were not under contract to plaintiff) ;
Beck v. Railway Teamster's Union, etc., 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13 (1898) (libel re-
strained); Webb v. Cooks', Waiters' & Waitresses' Union, etc., 205 S. W. 465 (Tex. Clv.
App. 1918) (constitutional right of an individual to trade where he pleases denies unions
the right to picket).
Picketing per se has been declared illegal by statute in Alabama, Colorado, Kansas,
Nebraska, Utah and Hawaii. The statutes are given in Lehman, Picketing: The Law of Its
Conduct and Restraint, U. S. L. Week, Sept. 25, 1934, at 56, n. 31.
In American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921); United
Chain Theatres, Inc. v. Philadelphia etc., Operators Union, 50 F. (2d) 189 (E. D. Pa.
1931); Berg Auto Trunk & Specialty Co., Inc. v. Wiener, 121 Misc. 796, 200 N. Y. Supp.
745 (Sup. Ct. 1923) the right to picket was recognized but in each instance expressly
limited.
An example of the extent to which some courts have gone can be seen in Gevas v. Greek
Restaurant Workers' Club, 99 N. J. Eq. 770, 134 Atl. 309 (Ch. 1926). The court said,
supra at 780, 734 Atl. at 313-314: "Obviously the line of demarcation between peaceful
picketing, if there is any such thing, and that which is threatening, intimidating or coercive,
is so finely drawn as to be almost imperceptible. . . .Nor is it necessary that the picket
or pickets intimidate by word or mouth or by actual violence .... Restraint of the mind
is just as potent as a threat of physical violence. . . . In fact silence is sometimes more
striking and impressive than the loud mouthings of the mob." In Rosenberg v. Retail
Clerks' Ass'n, 39 Cal. App. 67, 177 Pac. 864 (1918) the court found a growing tendency to
regard picketing as inherently illegal because it was inseparably associated with acts indis-
putably illegal.
Where the strike or combination is held to be illegal the courts have been prone to
enjoin all activities: Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1908) (applied Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, 26 STAT. 209 [18901, 15 U. S. C. A. § 1 [1927] to combinations of labor in restraint
of trade).; Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1916) (strike engineered
by union to break yellow dog contracts); Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443
(1921) (Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 730 [1914], 28 U. S. C. A. § 381 [1928] not contemplated
to cover illegal boycott) ; Sarros v. Nouris, 15 Del. Ch. 391, 138 Atl. 607 (1927) (strike to
compel recognition of union); Folsom Engraving Co. v. McNeil, 235 Mass. 269, 126 N. E.
479 (1920) (strike to compel employer to sign union agreement); Auburn Draying Co. v.
Wardell, 227 N. Y. 1, 124 N. E. 97 (1919) (boycott by union interfering with employer's
property rights); see Old Dominion Steam-Ship Co. v. McKenna, 30 Fed. 48, 50 (C. C. S. D
N. Y. 1887).
39. An example of the broad scope of the injunctions granted may be found in Albro 3.
Newton Co. v. Erickson, 70 Misc. 291, 298, 126 N. Y. Supp. 949, 954 (Sup. Ct. 1911):
" .. .enjoining the defendants, their attorneys, agents, servants, associates, confederates,
and all persons acting in aid of or in connection with them, or any of them, for conspiring,
combining, or acting in concert in any manner to injure or interfere with plaintiff's good
will, trade or business, for the purpose of coercing it to employ union labor . . . by order.
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of their powers as exercised in labor issues that has been severely censured.'0
Moreover, it has been shown that there is little helpful precedent to guide
the court in its determination of labor cases. Many long and carefully
written decisions discussing the scope of employee activity have done little
more than confuse the issue.4 '
The injunction often limits, if it does not eliminate the protective guaran-
ties of the Constitution.2 The emphasis upon property rights led to the
ing, directing, requiring, or by compelling by any by-law, rule or regulation or any act
thereunder, any person whatever to refrain from or cease working for any person, firm,
or corporation because they use material purchased of or furnished by plaintiff .... " In
W. P. Davis Machine Co. v. Robinson, 41 Misc. 329, 84 N. Y. Supp. 837 (Sup. Ct. 1903)
the order enjoined defendants from meeting anywhere within the limits of Rochester.
See FRA.-FURTER AD GpimNE, op. cit. supra note 34, at 86-122 for a discusson of the
unusual latitude of the injunction orders.
The effect of such restraint was clearly pointed out in Walter A. Wood Moowing & Reap-
ing Machine Co. v. Toohey, 114 Misc. 185, 196, 186 N. Y. Supp. 95, 102 (Sup. Ct. 1921):
"In an evenly balanced, bitter, long drawn out labor struggle, an edict of the court, leveled
at the strikers, shakes the morale of the workingmen. This is not the purpose of an in-
junction, although it is frequently, and perhaps generally, the purpose of the employer who
seeks it."
The obvious unfairness of the ex parte injunction was dearly indicated in Long v. Brick-
layers' & M1asons' Internat'l Union, 17 D. & C. 984, 984-985 (Pa. 1903) in which the court
confessed its inability to determine from an inspection of many pages of conflicting manu-
script facts which might form the basis of contempt charges.
The legislature of New York in 1930 "in response to the nation-wide (and very proper)
protest against the too-frequent issuance of drastic and bold cx parle injunctions in labor
disputes" made notice a requisite for the granting of all injunctions. N. Y. Cn. Pn=c. Acr.
(1920) § 882, as amended by Laws 1930, c. 378. The quotation is from an editorial ap-
pearing in N. Y. L. J., June 17, 1930, at 1490. But because the amount of notice was a
discretionary matter it provided no practical benefit. For a list of unreported cases in
which the notice proved worthless see Comment (1934) 19 Corm. L. Q. 49S.
40. FRxv, op. cit. supra note 30, Preface, objects to the -etting aside of basic rules of
equity as practiced in Great Britain and until 1888 in the United States. In connection
with this it is pertinent that most injunctions are obtained by employers. Witte, Labor's
Resort to Injunctions (1930) 39 YA r. L. J. 374-375, disclosed that of 1833 injunctions
granted but 24 were obtained by organized labor against employers. Nine were obtained
against public officers and the remainder were obtained by employers.
41. SPELL.NG AND LEwIs, Tnu LAw GOVERNNG INJ yMtcONS (1926) §§ 116, 117 find a
serviceable definition of "intimidation" cannot be given because of the many types of acts
which have been held to constitute it. Moreover, there has been made, in recent years, a
distinction between "picketing" and "peaceful picketing" and the latter, whatever it means,
has been held permissible.
42. The restriction of free speech is the most apparent ezample. United States v.
Taliaferro, 290 Fed. 214 (W. D. Va. 1922) (Clayton Act not intended to legalize insulting
epithets), af'd, 290 Fed. 906 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923). In Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co. v. Cruse,
189 Ala. 66, 66 So. 657 (1914) a statute inferentially denying the right to peaceful picket-
ing was held not violative of the life, liberty and happiness clause, and in Bx parle Williams,
158 Cal. 550, 111 Pac. 1035 (1910) an ordinance against picketing for an unlawful purpose
-was held a valid exercise of municipal power. Contra: Er parle Heffron, 179 Mlo. App. 639,
162 S. W. 652 (1914); Empire Theater Co. v. Cloke, 53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. 107 (1917).
For the proposition that an injunction against slander is beyond the scope of equity, see
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rendition of decrees insuring employers' property rights but worked a denial
of those of their employees. 43  An injunction, moreover, which prohibits the
employees from publicizing their side of the story, from enrolling new mem-
bers, from receiving strike benefits or from advising other workers to join them
irreparably damages the employees. Consequently, strikes are readily broken
and the employer enabled to dictate terms. 44
The injunction rests, moreover, on summary process and the facts, fre-
quently the only issues, are determined by a judge without the aid of a jury.
Thus, before the disputed facts can be determined by careful proceedings the
injunction places the authority and might of the state at the disposal of one
party.4
5
This growing popularity of the use of the equitable decree led to increased
agitation by the workers for legislation limiting the power of the court and
as a result the Clayton Act was enacted in 1914. 4 0 Hailed as a momentous
advancement in the industrial freedom of the worker, its effectiveness was
Ex porte Tucker, 110 Tex. 335, 220 S. W. 75 (1920). For a discussion of the power of
equity to enjoin libels, see Comment (1932) 2 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 61.
43. WoLL, op. cit. supra note 12, at 138.
The emphasis on individual rights has been greater in this country than in most older
nations, forming a basis for stressing the right of workers to bargain individually and to
obtain members for organizations. But this same emphasis has enabled the employer to
keep uppermost in the minds of the courts his right to do business without interference,
and has come to regard that privilege as a property right to be fully protected by the con-
stituted authority of the state. YODER, op. ct. supra note 4, at 477. By the more or less
complete enforcement of the employers' rights, constitutional rights of the workers have been
set aside. They include the denial of the rights of association, assembly, locomotion, free
press and free speech, peaceful persuasion. FRLY, op. cit. supra note 30, at 47.
44. Many of the injunctions would not be upheld in part or in entirety on appeal. The
lapse of time which necessarily occurs enables the petitioners to achieve their aim. YonE,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 501. McCRAcxEN, ST=IE INJUNCTIONs n TnE Nmv SouT
(1931) 3, found after a study of trade unionists and disinterested scholars and citizens that
the "equity process works badly in this class of cases." A personal survey of strikers in
such cases convinced him that the decrees did not greatly hamper their actions and greatly
lowered their respect for law. Id. at 49-130.
45. McCRACxEN, op. cit. supra note 44, at 32-45, classifies the objections to the injunc-
tion under two headings: Firstly, legal objections comprising (1) evasion of safeguards
of liberty, (2) assumption of executive power, (3) assumption of legislative power, and
(4) indefiniteness of the decree; and, secondly, economic objections, which include (1)
placing of property rights above personal rights, (2) perversion of the status quo doctrine,
(3) inadequate consideration of economic facts (here the authors point out that Injunctions
are not granted when a business competes with a business but such are decreed when there
is competition between labor and business), (4) increase of industrial unrest, and (5) de-
crease in respect for the courts. Other alleged faults are discussed in GRE_. AND FRANK-
ruRTER, STATE LEGrsMToN Lnmrrno LABOR INJUNCTIONS (1931) e, f.
46. 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 28 U. S. C. A. § 386 (1926).
As early as 1908 the Democratic party platform contained an anti-injunction plank. It
was directed against the then presidential candidate, William H. Taft, who was termed the
"father of injunctions" in labor circles. LORwiN, THE AmEanCA FEDERAnON OF LABOR
(1933) 92.
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practically nullified by strict interpretation.47  Several states meanwhile,
using the Clayton Act as a model, had enacted similar legislation. 8  But
in Truax v. Corrigan4 9 the limitations imposed by such legislation were held
unconstitutional. 50 Thus, the evils of improper use of the injunction were
restored and.its function in the law often overlooked.51
B.-Contempt
The United States Supreme Court in 1895 firmly established the power of
equity to punish for contempt those who violated their decrees.52  Thus labor
47. The act was held to apply only to controversies between employer and employee
and not to a dispute with a union: Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921);
Kinloch TeL Co. v. Local Union etc., Electrical Workers, 275 Fed. 241 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921);
Michaelson v. United States, 291 Fed. 940 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923), rev'd on other grounds, 266
U. S. 42 (1924); Montgomery v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 293 Fed. 680 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923);
DalI-Overland Co. v. Wilys-Overland, Inc., 263 Fed. 171 (N. D. Ohio 1919). And not
to illegal combinations or conspiracies: Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, supra; Stephens
v. Ohio State Tel. Co., 240 Fed. 759 (N. D. Ohio 1917); Kroger Grocery & Bahing Co.
v. Retail Clerks' etc., Ass'n, 250 Fed. 890 (E. D. Mo. 1918); Columbus Heating & Ventilat-
ing Co. v. Pittsburgh Bldg. Trades Council, 17 F. (2d) 805 (W. D. Pa. 1927).
48. The earlier anti-injunction acts limiting the jurisdiction of the courts in labor dis-
pute cases were based on part or all of §§ 17-20 of the Clayton Act. These statutes can
be seen in ARz. REv. CODE Am;7. (Struckxmeyer, 1928) § 4286 (enacted 1913); Ir Rxv.
STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 22, § 58 (enacted 1925); KA.. R'v. STAT. A,'w. (1923) §§ 60-1104
to 60-1107 (enacted 1907); MiN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §§ 4256, 4257 (enacted 1917); N.
J. CoIL,. STAT. (Supp. 1925) tit. 9, § 107-131a (enacted 1926); N. D. Cozrr. LAws A.m.
(Supp. 1925) §§ 7214al, 7214a2 (enacted 1919); ORM. CoD A .. (1930) §§ 49-902, 49-903
(enacted 1919); UTAH REv. STAT. A.ra. (1933) §§ 49-2-6, 49-2-7 (enacted 1917); WASH.
Rav. STAT. AN-N. (Remington, 1932) § 7612 (enacted 1919).
49. 257 U. S. 312 (1921).
50. Montgomery v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 293 Fed. 680 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923); People v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 70 Colo. 90, 198 Pac. 146 (1921); Gillespie v. People, 188 II. 176,
58 N. E. 1007 (1900); Coffeyville Vitrified Brick & Tile Co. v. Perry, 69 Kan. 297, 76 Pac.
848 (1904); State ex rel. Smith v. Daniels, 118 Minn. 155, 136 N. W. 584 (1912); State v.
Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 31 S. W. 781 (1895); People v. Marcus, 185 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 1073
(1906) ; Jackson v. Berger, 92 Ohio St. 130, 110 N. E. 732 (1915) ; Bemio v. State, 12 Okla.
Cr. 114, 152 Pac. 456 (1915); State ex re. Zillmer v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530, 90 N. W.
1098 (1392).
In Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 (1921), the Court held that although the Arizona
statute was identical with § 20 of the Clayton Act, the construction placed upon it by
the Arizona court made it as distinctly unlike the federal act as if it were in "wholly dif-
ferent language."
51. The function of the injunction order is to restrain lawlessness when it is present
and likely to cause irreparable damage. See W. A. Wood Moving & Reaping Machine Co. v.
Toohey, 114 Misc. 185, 197, 186 N. Y. Supp. 95, 102 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
52. This principle of issuing injunctions and punishing contennors for violations thereof
was firmly established as a power of equity courts by the case of In re Debs, 158 U. S.
564 (1895). The nationwide character of the strike and the publicity given it brought home
to employers and employees the effectiveness of this power.
SwAYZEE, CoNism or CouRT IN LABOR IuTuNcrioi; CASES (1935) 41-43 indicates the
increasing popularity of the injunction in labor disputes in New York. Between 1904 and
1932, 901 decrees were granted. Between 1920 and 1932, 614 applications were favorably
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found itself confronted with an additional burden with which to contend.
The injunctions granted were often indefinite. It was frequently difficult to
ascertain who was included within the scope of the decree and what acts were
forbidden. 53 Besides, the contemnor was accountable only to the judge who,
in most instances, had issued the injunction and ordered the citation. There
was no right to admission on bail, nor to a change of venue, nor to trial by
jury. That one accused of a crime should be afforded more protection than
one accused of contempt has long been criticized as inconsistent with reason
and justice.54  Yet the courts have tenaciously held to the power of contempt
as one inherent in their very being.55 This contention of the courts has been
attacked 56 and several jurisdictions have yielded in some measure.5 7  Never-
theless, judicial opinion, remains much the same in this respect. In Michael-
son v. United States58 the Supreme Court, construing a section of the Clayton
Act providing for jury trials in labor contempt cases, permitted this limita-
tion where the act constituting the contempt was a crime and was not done
in or so near the court as to interfere with the administration of justice.
That there was a need for remedial measures was apparent also from the
large number of reversals and modifications of decrees granted or refused to
acted upon. In the latter period there were 784 petitions made. See Battle, Book Review
(1936) 5 FoRD.T L. Rxv. 191.
53. See McCRAcxEr, op. cit. supra note 44, at 38 and cases discussed at pp. 49-130; see
also FRANFi-mxRt AND GREENE, op. cit. supra note 34, at 86-122 for a discussion of the
unusual latitude of the orders; GREENE AND FRA xFuRTER, op. cit. supra note 45, at f;
OAK:ES, THE LAW OF ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLCTS (1927) § 587.
54. See GREENE A FRANrUmTFR, op. cit. supra note 45, at q, r. YODER, op. Cit. supra
note 4, at 501-502, in a comparison of the two circumstances indicates also that one
accused of a crime is generally entitled to the right of indictment by a grand jury, that
the penalties are fixed and that the defendant is given a formal trial in which he Is given
counsel, nor can his failure to testify be used against him and, in addition, the state must
first present a prima facie case before he need defend himself. Truly, labor's application of
Lewis Carroll's account of the ultimatum of the terrier to the mouse:
"I'll be Judge, I'll be jury," said cunning old Fury:
"I'll try the whole case, and condemn you to death I"
seems an applicable analogy.
55. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U. S. 505 (1873); Walton Lunch Co. v. Kearney, 236 Mass.
310, 128 N. E. 429 (1920); People v. Rice, 144 N. Y. 249, 39 N. E. 88 (1894).
56. SWAYZEE, op. cit. supra note 52, at 23, questions the "inherent" character of the con-
tempt power.
57. Utah, as early as 1917, (UTi REv. STAT. ANN. [1933] § 49-2-8) provided jury trials
in contempt cases. See note 58, infra.
Statutes providing for jury trials in contempt cases do not attempt to oust the court of
jurisdiction to punish for violations of decrees. The change is procedural. "The jury Is as
much a part of the Supreme Court as the justice thereof, and obviously the requirement
that a jury rather than a justice shall resolve the factual disputes arising in contempt
proceedings deprives the Supreme Court of nothing." Justice Steinbrink in Kronowitz v.
Schlansky, 282 N. Y. Supp. 564, 569 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
58. 266 U. S. 42 (1924). Although this case recognized and reiterated the inherent
power of the court to punish for contempt it held that the Clayton Act (38 STAT. 730, 738
[1914], 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 386, 387 [1926]) providing for a jury trial in contempt arising
out of the violation of a decree was valid in that the inherent power may be regulated
within limits not precisely defined.
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employers. 59 The significance of this condition becomes signal in view of
the fact that the discretion of the court will not be disturbed unless there has
been an abuse of its injunctive powers.0°
Current Anti-Injunction Legislation
The current legislation, designed to remedy present abuses, has been based,
in part, on the draft of a Model Bill prepared by Professor Felix Frankfurter
and Nathan Greene.01 Section 3 of the bill in denying injunctive relief against
the commission of certain acts attempts to legalize some which in certain
jurisdictions have been held unlawful.02  It provides that no court may pro-
hibit anyone from working or striking, from joining any union, from paying
or withholding strike or unemployment benefits or insurance, from lawfully
aiding any person against whom proceedings are pending or any person from
prosecuting any action in any court, from giving publicity to the facts of any
dispute if without intimidation, coercion, fraud, violence, breach of peace or
the threat thereof, from ceasing to patronize or employ any person, from
assembling, advising, agreeing, inducing, or urging others to do those acts.0
Although obviously intended to be applied solely to labor disputes this
section is so worded as to permit a broad application, the limitation extend-
ing to all petitioners and thus reducing the likelihood of constitutional objec-
59. A random investigation of cases in New York disclosed reversals in the following
labor disputes: Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E.
130 (1927); Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N. Y. 65, 159 N. E. 863 (1928);
J. H. & S. Theatres, Inc. v. Fay, 260 N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509 (1932); Sinsheimer v.
United Garment Workers of America, 77 Hun 215, 28 N. Y. Supp. 321 (1894); altrks
Arnheim, Inc. v. Hillman, 198 App. Div. 88, 189 N. Y. Supp. 369 (1st Dep't 1921); Alt-
man v. Schlesinger, 204 App. Div. 513, 198 N. Y. Supp. 128 (1st Dep't 1923); Yablono-
witz v. Krm, 205 App. Div. 440, 199 N. Y. Supp. 769 (1st Dep't 1923); L. Daitch & Co.,
Inc. v. Cohen, 218 App. Div. 80, 217 N. Y. Supp. 817 (Ist Dep't 1926); Mayflower Amuse-
ment Corp. v. Kaplan, 233 App. Div. 873, 251 N. Y. Supp. 805 (2d Dep't 1931); G. F.
Stuhmer & Co. v. Korman, 235 App. Div. 856, 257 N. Y. Supp. 140 (2d Dep't 1932).
Decrees were modified in A. L. Reed Co. v. Whiteman, 238 N. Y. 545, 144 N. E. 885
(1924); Wise Shoe Co., Inc. v. Lowenthal, 242 App. Div. 660, 272 N. Y. Supp. 612 (2d
Dep't 1934).
60. The decree rendering or denying the injunction will be reversed only if it is dearly
shown that it was improvidently granted and hurtful to the appellant. Van Orden v.
Ledwith, 44 App. Div. 580, 60 N. Y. Supp. 802 (2d Dep't 1899).
61. GjmE A'ND FRA- F usRTE, oP. cit. =pra note 45.
62. The jurisdictions differ as to whether enjoining publications or utterances in further-
ance of a strike or boycott is precluded upon constitutional grounds. OARxES, op. Cit. supra
note 53, § 544; see SPEL=G AzD Lnwzs, op. cit. supra, note 41, §§ 116, 117.
63. The new legislation containing § 3 of the Model Act, in whole or part, is to be
found in 47 STAT. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. § 104 (1926) ; Colo. Laws 1933, c. 59, § 3; Idaho Laws
1933, c. 215, § 3; Ind. Laws 1933, c. 12, § 4; LA. Gm;-. STAT. (Dart, Supp. 1934) § 4379.7;
MD. A'. COD (Bagby, Supp. 1935) art. 100, § 67; Minn. Laws 1933, c. 416, § 4, 5; N.
D. Laws 1935, c. 247, §§ 4, 5; N. Y. Crv. PRA. Acr. (1935) § 876a; Ore. Laws 1933, c. 355,
§§ 4, 5; Utah Laws 1933, c. 15, § 3; WAsH. REv. STAT. Am;. (1935) §§ 7612-4, 7612-5; Wis.
STAT. (1933) § 268.20; Wyom. Laws 1933, c. 37, § 3. The statutes of Indiana, Minnesota,
North Dakota, Oregon and Washington omit the clause: "Ceasing to patronize or to em-
ploy any person or persons." Thus the right of boycott is not exprezsly granted in those
jurisdictions.
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tion.64 In Truax v. Corrigan65 a closely divided court invalidated a state
statute withdrawing the right to injunctive relief in controversies between
employers and employees over terms and conditions of employment.00 It
was held that if the statute were intended to withdraw, in effect, all remedies
against certain unlawful acts it was the taking of property without due process
of law, and that if it were intended to deny injunctive relief to employers it
violated the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Aside from any constitutional considerations the possibility of strict con-
struction still remains. 6 7  The Model Bill would legalize publicizing the facts
of a dispute if it be without intimidation or coercion or if it be by any other
means not involving fraud, violence or breach of the peace. The term "intimi-
dation" has been diversely construed and the courts may so continue to inter-
pret the word.68  "Coercion," "fraud," "violence" and "breach of the peace"
are words also of many meanings. Similarly "assembling peaceably" to do the
acts mentioned in the section or to promote lawful interests depends largely
upon judicial interpretation. Thus some of the abuses previously encoun-
tered in the use of the injunction remain present, that is, the final determina-
tion of fact questions remains in one person who has only a maze of con-
flicting precedents for a guide.69 In the final analysis the court must view the
new legislation in light of the intention of the legislatures, an intention which
has undoubtedly been guided by the effect of unfavorable past decisions con-
cerning labor disputes. 70
On the other hand, the new enactments provide for the issuance of injunc-
tions when certain conditions are present. Where the threatened acts will
cause irreparable or substantial injury for which there is no adequate remedy
at law and where police protection is inadequate or withheld a decree will
64. The constitutional aspect is discussed in GREENE AND FRANxmRxaR, op. cit. supra
note 45, at g, h, i, j.
65. 257 U. S. 312 (1921), cited note 50, supra.
66. See note 47, supra.
67. In United Elec. Coal Companies v. Rice (C. C. A. 7th, 1935), U. S. L. Week, Nov. 5,
1935, at 134, the plaintiff sought to restrain defendant union from endeavoring to make him
break its contract with another union. Although the injunction was refused on other
grounds the court said the Norris-LaGuardia Act would not apply because there was no
dispute between the petitioner and its employees. In Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Anderson, 7
F. Supp. 332 (E. D. Ill. 1934) the temporary restraining order was dissolved but the court
intimated that since the word "picketing" was not used in the federal act the definition of
"picketing" would be subject to previous judicial interpretation.
68. See note 42, supra.
69. FRY, op. cit. supra note 30, at 29-30.
70. Several jurisdictions have enacted the declaration of public policy suggested by § 5
of the Model Bill. It denotes that the practice of granting injunctions ex partse is subject
to abuse in labor cases because of the position of the parties is necessarily altered by the
decree, because the true facts cannot be ascertained from contradictory affidavits and be-
cause the time taken in the course of appeal makes correction in such decrees unavailing.
The enactments are to be found in Colo. Laws 1933, c. 59, § 5; Idaho Laws 1933, c. 215,
§ 5; LA. GEs. STAT. (Dart, Supp. 1934) § 4379.9; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, Supp. 1935) art.
100, § 69; N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 477, § 1; Utah Laws, 1933, c. 15, § 5; Wxs. STAT. (1933)
§ 268.22.
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issue upon a hearing in open court where there is opportunity for cross-
examination.7 1 In addition, the court must find as a fact that the balance of
convenience as to each item of relief sought must lie in favor of the petitioner
before relief may be granted as to such item. Reasonable notice72 of the
application must be given all defendants and a bond sufficient to pay for all
damages and costs resulting from an improvident decree must be made. 0
While the new legislation has narrowed the scope of injunctive relief the
injured party still has redress at law and the protection of criminal statutes
which are not foreclosed by the denial of the equitable remedy.7 4
While only one of the recent state statutes has been upheld by a court of
last resort 75 the highest court of Massachusetts,70 following the line of reason-
ing in Truax v. Corrigan, found, in an advisory opinion, that the dominating
purpose of the sections of the new legislation appeared to favor a particular
class and so impaired equality before the law
7
71. These provisions are expressed wholly or in part in the following: Colo. Laws 1933,
c. 59, § 6; Idaho Laws 1933, c. 215, § 6; Ind. Laws 1933, c. 12, § 7; L.%. GE:.. STr,. (Dart,
Supp. 1934) § 4379.10; Mo. ANN. Coot (Bagby, Supp. 1935) arL 10D, § 70; Mfss. A .
LAws (Lawyer's Co-op., Supp. 1935) c. 214, § 9A; Minn. Laws 1933, c. 416, § 7; N. Y.
Cnr. PR.Ac. AcT (1935) § 876a; N. D. Laws 1935, c. 247, § 7; Ore. Laws 1933, c. 355, § 7;
PA. STAT. Aaxi. (Purdon, Supp. 1934) tit. 43, § 203; Utah Laws 1933, c. 15, § 6; Wsm
REv. STAT. Aur. (Remington, Supp. 1935) § 7612-7; Wis. STAT. (1933) § 268.23; Wyom.
Laws 1933, § 7. Maine Laws 1933, c. 261, § 1, provides merely for the issuance of an order
only upon hearing in open court where witnesses may be cross-examined. The clause con-
cerning the balance of conveniences, that concerning the inability of public officers to pro-
tect complainant's property and the one which denies jurisdiction as to any act contained
in § 3 of the Model Bill is omitted from the Pennsylvania statute. The last clauwe is
omitted also from the laws of Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Dakota, Oregon
and Washington. This clause, however, is mere repetition. It would seem that where con-
tained in § 3 of the Model Bill and those laws based upon it, its inclusion in this section
is unnecessary. Thus the only jurisdictions in which the clause is totally absent from the
new labor legislation are Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, which have no section comparable
with § 3.
72. The general provision concerning notice to defendants and to public officers charged
with the duty of protecting complainant's property where a temporary restraining order
is sought, requires a reasonable notice of application for the order of no less than 48 hours.
In Indiana, Minnesota, North Dakota, Oregon and Washington the notice provision is
absent. In Maine the injunction may be granted without a hearing if the affidavits are
upon oath. In Pennsylvania the notice required is "reasonable.' For a discussion con-
cerning the interpretation of that word in a former New York statute see note 39, supra.
The statutes in which the notice provisions appear are in note 71, supra.
73. For statutes see note 71, supra.
74. For example, picketing is illegal per se in several jurisdictions. See note 38, supru.
Disorderly conduct statutes are not affected by the new laws nor are criminal statutes
designed for the protection of property.
75. Dehan v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Beverage Dispensers, Local Union, IS9
So. 637 (La. 1935), which held the right to an injunction is not a constitutional right and
may be regulated by statute.
76. In re Opinion of the Justices, 275 Mass. 580, 176 N. E. 649 (1931).
77. Nevertheless, the federal law has so far met with success. Refusal to restrain
certain acts: Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 71 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A. 2dj 1934),
cert. denked, 293 U. S. 595 (1934) (intention to strike for closed shop) ; Cinderella Theater
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The Yellow Dog Contract
This type of agreement generally has been used in one or a combination of
the following forms: The employee agrees to dissociate himself from his union;
the prospective employee agrees to undertake no union obligations during the
period of his employment; or, where there is a company union,1 8 an organ-
ization generally looking to the interests of the employer, 9 the employee
agrees to immediate affiliation. While many jurisdictions have upheld the
validity of this type of contract as the voluntary undertaking of both par-
ties,80 the freedom to contract may exist more in fiction than in fact.81
Co., Inc. v. Sign Writers' Local Union, 6 F. Supp. 164 (E. D. Mich. 1934) (use of "unfair"
signs); Miller Parlor Furn. Co., Inc. v. Furniture Workers' Industrial Union, 8 F. Supp.
209 (N. J. 1934) (picketing by union whose members were not employees of petitioner).
But the Act was held not to deny jurisdiction to the courts where picketing was intimidat-
ing or affecting the free exercise of the right to work of those who wish to work. Knapp-
Monarch Co. v. Anderson, 7 F. Supp. 332, 339 (E. D. Ill. 1934).
Where failure of local officers to furnish protection resulted from a misconception of
their authority rather than unwillingness, an injunction was refused in Knapp-Monarch Co.
v. Anderson, supra.
The petition must allege facts showing that the governmental machinery for settlement
of the dispute has been exhausted. Stanley v. Peabody Coal Co., 5 F. Supp. 612 (S. D.
IM. 1933).
A controversy between a theater and a union none of whose members had contractual
relations with plaintiff, was held a "labor dispute." Cinderella Theater Co., Inc. v. Sign
Writers' Local Union, supra.
The constitutionality of the new Act was upheld in Aberdeen Restaurant Corp. v.
Gottfried, N. Y. L. J. July 2, 1935, at 18 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.). It was said that if the law
deprived plaintiff of a right to an injunction it was invalid, but the statute merely attempted
to limit the circumstances under which an order could be obtained. Since the law goes
merely to the remedy it was held also to apply to actions begun prior to its passage.
Contra: Micamold Radio Corp. v. Beedie, 282 N. Y. Supp. 77 (Sup. Ct. 1935) which held
the statute had no retroactive effect because it lacks a clear legislative expression showing
such an intention.
The statute was held valid also in Dehan v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Beverage
Dispensers, etc., 159 So. 637 (La. 1935).
78. The first company union has been attributed to Win. Filene's Sons Co., Boston, in
1898. BERNHEIM AND V s Dop.ax, op. cit. supra note 13, at 75. The authors undertake a
discussion of the growth of the company-type organization at pp. 75-113.
79. The Bureau of Labor recently published statistics conclusively proving that com-
pany unions were almost wholly without "independence." Of 593 unions having 530,388
members only 10 unions containing 1.2% of the total number of workers in this type of
union had the attributes of independent, entities. The standards investigated were: "Whether
the company union paid dues, had regular membership meetings, made written agree-
ments with employers, maintained contracts with other workers' organizations and retained
the right to demand arbitration of differences whereby the management relinquished Its
absolute veto power." It was disclosed that 76 of the unions numbering 12.8% of the
workers were devoid of any of these standards. N. Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1935, at 46.
80. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1916); Kinloch Tel. Co. v.
Local Union, etc., Electrical Workers, 275 Fed. 241 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921); Moore Drop
Forging Co. v. McCarthy, 243 Mass. 554, 137 N. E. 919 (1923); Flaccus v. Smith, 199 Pa.
128, 48 Atl. 894 (1901).
81. The change from manual to machine manufacture withdrew the demand for
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Practically there can be no such freedom where the supply of labor exceeds
the demand. The employee, present or prospective, will readily agree to such
provisions in order to secure or retain employment. In seemingly complete
disregard of the true nature of the agreement involved, the Supreme Court in
Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell8 2 held such a contract valid, reason-
ing that the employee could either accept employment under the conditions
imposed or refuse it.5 3 Of late, however, there has been a trend in a few
jurisdictions, toward examining the contract closely 84  Although cognizant of
the unfairness of this contract the attempt by a number of states to discourage
its use by imposing criminal liability on those employing it, was held un-
constitutional.8 5
Several jurisdictions as an aid to the interpretation of sections of the new
legislation, designed to eliminate the effect of the yellow dog contract, have
indicated the public policy of the state which should govern s.8 These expres-
sions of public policy recognize the helplessness of the worker in so far as
actual liberty of contract is concerned and the necessity of permitting full
freedom of association and the designation of representatives in negotiating
terms and conditions of employment. By this announcement the legislatures
have attempted to present the relative position of the parties as it in fact
exists. Such a procedure is vital for a true application of the concept of con-
tractual freedom 87
mechanical ability in many industries and opened the door to the employment of women
and children. With this overabundance of labor supply wages rapidly fell. YoDER, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 76-77. The decline of wages in industry was so precipitous after 1929
that the advocacy of "New Deal" measures by the pre-cent Administration was centered
about a plan to raise wages.
82. 245 U. S. 229 (1916).
83. justice Brandeis, dissenting in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229,
271 (1916), said: "If it is coercion to threaten to strike unless plaintiff consents to a closed
union shop, it is coercion also to threaten not to give one employment unless the applicant
will consent to a non-union shop."
84. In Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 1S7 N. E. 130
(1927) the contract was held invalid because of lack of consideration. In Kraemer
Hosiery Co. v. American Fed. etc., of Hosiery Workers, 305 Pa. 206, 157 Ad. 588 (1931)
the court refused to enjoin defendants from peacefully persuading employees under "con-
tract" from leaving their positions and joining the union. The holding was based on the
theory that the agreement bound the workers not to affiliate while remaining in plaintiffs
employ.
The lack of consideration was attacked also by Senators Borah and Norris in senatorial
debates, quotations appearing in part in WoLL, op. di. supra note 12, at 78.
85. See note 50, supra.
86. This declaration of public policy is § 1 of the Model Bill and has been enacted in
California, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Mlaryland, Minnesota, New York, North
Dakota, Oregon, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming and by the federal law. The statutes
are to be found in note 88, infra.
87. justice Brandeis "saw in the growth of the employers' economic power a serious
threat to the general welfare and to the worker's liberty. He felt, moreover, that there
would be but 'little probability [in most trades] of attaining the best conceivable conditions
unless in some form a union of the employees exists?" MLso, BRAsams: LAWYEn A.,D
JUDGE IN THE MODEsRN STATE (1933) 129-130.
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The new enactments,88 voiding the yellow dog contract have apparently
circumvented the precedents laid down in Adair v. United States8" and
Coppage v. Kansas.90 Instead of declaring such an agreement criminal, enforce-
ment both at law and equity is withheld. Nevertheless the advisory opinions
of two courts9' have declared that such legislation contravenes the due process
clause but both, in so doing, relied wholly upon the above-mentioned cases.
Whether this legislation does violate the Fourteenth Amendment is seriously
questionable. 2 It has been said that "due process" implies a conformity 'with
natural and inherent principles of justice. 5 Certainly the right to the injunc-
tion is not an absolute one." Moreover, it seems that the recent enact-
ments are clearly within the police power of the states in avoiding a conflict
of rights and insuring an enjoyment of rights to each party reasonably con-
sistent with the use and enjoyment of rights by 9thers.9 5 If anything, this
legislation seeks to preserve the principles of liberty and justice rather than
to destroy them.
For a discussion of employers' objections to collective bargaining, see BmNumnm AND VAN
DoREN, op. cit. supra note 13, at 43.
88. The effect of such agreements has apparently been negatived by the following statutes:
ARz. REv. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 1360a as enacted by Laws 1931, c. 19; Cal.
Laws 1933, c. 5,66, § 2; CoLo. CoM'. STAT. (Supp. 1932) § 4204.1, enacted also In Colo.
Laws 1933, c. 59, § 2; Idaho Laws 1933, c. 215, § 2; Ill. Laws 1933, p. 588; Ind. Laws
1933, c. 12, § 3; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, Supp. 1934) § 4381.2; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, Supp.
1935) art. 100, § 66; MASS. ANN. LAWS (Lawyer's Co-op., Supp. 1935) c. 149, § 20A; Minn.
Laws 1933, c. 416, § 1; N. J. Laws, 1932, c. 244; N. Y. Civ. RiGHTS LAW (1935) § 17;
N. D. Laws 1935, c. 247, § 3; OHIo GEN. CODE (Page, Supp. 1934) § 6241-1; Ore. Laws
1933, c. 355, § 3; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1934) tit. 43, § 205; Utah Laws, 1933, c.
15, § 2; WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, Supp. 1935) § 7612-3; Wis. STAT. (1933)
§ 268.19; Wyom. Laws 1933, c. 37, § 1.
A California statute of 1919 sought to prevent the effect of the yellow dog contract by
denying injunctive relief to. prevent the breach of a contract other than a contract for
personal services which are special, unique, extraordinary or intellectual in character and for
which the compensation is at least $6000 per year.
Witte, "Yellow Dog" Contracts (1930) 6 Wis. L. REv. 28, credits Professor Herman
Oliphant with this section of the new legislation which was unsuccessfully Introduced In
Ohio in 1925.
89. 208 U. S. 161 (1908), cited note 27, supra.
90. 236 U. S. 1 (1915), cited note 29, supra.
91. In re Opinion of the Justices, 275 Mass. 580, 176 N. E. 649 (1931); In re Opinion
of the Justices, 86 N. H. 597, 166 AtI. 640 (1930). A bill containing the features of the
new legislation (House bill no. 133 [1935] was not passed by the New Hampshire As-
sembly.
92. Nevertheless, the author of Legis. (1935) 9 ST. Jom's L. REv. 462 concludes that
there is no power in the legislature to declare void lawful contracts made by persons relative
to their labor.
93. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 390 (1897).
94. See dissenting opinion of justice Brandeis in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 347
(1921).
95. See 2 Coor=y, CONSTITUTIONAL LI'TATIONS (Carrington, 8th ed. 1927) 1223. There
is an implied "liability" that every holder of property shall not use it so as to Injure the
enjoyment of others having an equal right in their property. See Commonwealth v. Alger,
61 Mass. 54, 84 (1849).
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Contempt Provision
The new legislation tends to equalize the position of a contemnor with that
of a criminal in respect to the rights accorded each. It provides that the
accused be admitted to bail,96 be given reasonable notice to permit prepara-
tion of his defense,9 7 and be accorded a jury trial as a matter of right. s These
rights which tradition fully protects, are now enjoyed by those accused of
crime. In some jurisdictions the contemnor may demand the retirement of
the judge sitting in the proceedings where the charge results from an attack
upon his character or conduct. 99 But neither this feature nor that of trial
by jury apply when the contempt is committed within the immediate presence
of the court or so near it as to affect the administration of justice.
In light of Miczaelson v. United States'00 and the recent attitude of the
courts in some states there is good reason to believe that at least parts of
this section will be upheld. This view is strengthened by the fact that this part
of the legislation is broadly applied to all contemnors.201
By the suggestions of the Model Bill the contemnor is no longer at the
mercy of the very judge who may have ordered the citation. A few jurisdic-
tions have, in addition to the above-mentioned provisions, limited the amount
of fine and length of imprisonment which may be imposed. 0 2
96. This provision is to be found in Colo. Laws 1933, c. 59, § 10; Idaho Laws 1933, c.
215, § 10; LA. Gm. STAT. (Dart, Supp. 1934) § 4379.14; Mle. Laws 1933, c. 261, § 2; BID.
AwN. CODE (Bagby, Supp. 1935) art. 100, § 74; PA. STAT. Arim. (Purdon, Supp. 1935) tit.
17, § 2047; Utah Laws 1933, c. 15, § 10; Wis. STAT. (1933) § 268.27.
97. For the statutes see note 96, supra.
98. This provision is to be found in 47 STAT. 72, 29 U. S. C. A. § 111 (1932); Colo.
Laws 1933, c. 59, § 10; Idaho Laws 1933, c. 215, § 10; Ind. Laws 1933, c. 12, § 11; LA.
Gm. STAT. (Dart, Supp. 1934) § 4379.14; Mle. Laws 1933, c. 261, § 2; BfD. A.:-. Coo
(Bagby, Supp. 1935) art. 100, § 74; AAss. Am,€. LAws (Lawyer's Co-op., Supp. 1935) C.
220, § 13A; Binn. Laws 1933, c. 416, § 10; N. Y. Cirv. PAf Acr (1935) § 882a; N. D.
Laws 1935, c. 247, § 10; Ore. Laws 1933, c. 355, § 11; PA. STAT. A-;. (Purdon, Supp. 1934)
tit. 17, § 2047; Utah Laws 1933, c. 15, § 10; WASH. REv. STAT. A.. (Remington, Supp.
1935) § 7612-11; Wis. STAT. (1933) § 268.27. The Utah statute has been in effect since
1917.
99. This provision is to be found in 47 STAT. 73, 29 U. S. C. A. § 112 (1932); Colo.
Laws 1933, c. 59, § 10; Idaho Laws 1933, c. 215, § 10; Ind. Laws 1933, c. 12, § 12; LA.
GEN. STAT. (Dart, Supp. 1934) § 4379.14; DID. A=1. CODE (Bagby, Supp. 1935) art. 100,
§ 74; MAss. A=i. LAws (Lawyer's Co-op., Supp. 1934) c. 220, § 13B as enacted by Laws
1935, c. 220; Minn. Laws 1933, c. 416, § 11; N. D. Laws 1935, c. 247, § 11; Ore. Laws 1933,
c. 355, § 12; PA. STAT. Ainy. (Purdon, Supp. 1934) tit. 17, § 2047; Utah Laws 1933, c. IS,
§ 10; WAsH. Rnv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, Supp. 1935) § 7612-12; Wis. Sr, s. (1933) §
268.27.
100. 266 U. S. 42 (1924), cited note 58, supra.
101. The New York enactment, however, is designed to include only contempts arising
"out of any failure or refusal to obey any mandate of a court contained in or incidental
to an injunction order granted by such court in any case involving, or growing out of a
labor dispute... " N. Y. Cv. PRAc. AcT (1935) § 882a.
102. The suggestion of § 11 of the Model Bill limiting the fine to $100 and imprison-
ment in the county jail to 15 days has been adopted in Colo. Laws 1933, c. S9, § 11;
Idaho Laws 1933, c. 215, § 11; LA. GEY. STAT. (Dart, Supp. 1934) § 4379.15; Mo. A,;..
LAws (Bagby, Supp. 1935) art. 100, § 75; PA. STAT. AmT. (Purdon, Supp. 193S) tit. 17, §
19361
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The enactment of these provisions will no doubt eliminate a source of
grievance. But the difficulty of indefiniteness in the injunction remains, leav-
ing a vague borderline of acts which may or may not be included within the
decree. 103 Thus the employee engaging in such an act in the belief that he is
within his right may find himself subject to contempt charges. Legislative
enactments cannot cure such defects, however. It is the duty of the courts
to issue decrees which enable the parties clearly to ascertain their respective
rights.
Other Features of the New Legislation
The importance of definitely relating the allegedly unlawful acts to all the
defendants named has never been sufficiently emphasized.104 Several of the
state legislatures following the suggestion of the Model Bill now relieve union
officials of all liability when no proof of actual participation, authorization or
ratification is offered.' 0 5 This section in eliminating an existing discrimina-
tion of comparatively recent origin which is peculiar to industrial disputes,
restores the rules of agency long established in every other branch of the
law. Since it merely removes a burden imposed by judicial authority it can
hardly be questioned constitutionally. A presumption of agency that never
should have had a place in the law is removed.
Not all labor disputes are bona fide.101 Unless the controversy is an honest
one and unless attempts have been made to settle it, equity should not aid
the wrongdoer. The maxim that one must come into equity with clean hands
is one of antiquity and should be accorded recognition in this field of liti-
gation as in any other. To insure the observance of this maxim several states
now require that the petitioner shall have made reasonable efforts to settle
with the opposing parties either by negotiation or through the medium of
arbitrative or mediative machinery. Consonant with these principles the
2048; Utah Laws 1935, c. 15, § 11; Wis. STAT. (1933) § 268.28. The latter statute con-
tains a $25 and 10-day limit.
103. See note 53, supra.
104. United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922) held
that labor organizations, whether incorporated or not, were subject to suit and their funds
subject to attachment. That the problem was not a closed one is apparent from the dis-
cussion in Note (1923) 27 A. L. R. 786. The need for legislation to remove a presumption
that the entire union and its officers were engaged in "an unlawful conspiracy" was ex-
pressed in SEN. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., (1932) 19.
105. This was contained in § 4 of the Model Bill and is now the law as expressed by
47 STAT. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. § 106 (1934); Colo. Laws 1933, c. 59, § 4; Idaho Laws 1933, c.
215, § 4; Ind. Laws 1933, c. 12, § 6; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, Supp. 1934) § 4379.8; MD.
ANN. LAWS (Bagby, Supp. 1935) tit. 100, § 68; MASS. ANN. LAWS (Lawyer's Co-op., Supp.
1934) c. 149, § 20B as enacted by Laws 1935, c. 407; Minn. Laws 1933, c. 416, § 6; N. Y.
Civ. PRAc. AcT (1935) § 876a (6); N. D. Laws 1935, c. 247, § 6; Ore. Laws 1933, c. 355,
§ 6; Utah Laws 1933, c. 15, § 4; WAsH. REv. STAT. Awx. (Remington, Supp. 1935) § 7612-
6; Wis. STAT. (1933) § 268.21.
106. "Racketeering" existing in certain labor unions is no longer of negligible magnitude.
The N. Y. World-Telegram, Oct. 8, 1935, in an editorial, reiterated Special Prosecutor
Thomas E. Dewey's ultimatum that "such [rackets] must be stamped out."
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laws of several states have adopted section 7 of the Model Bill providing
that unless such attempts are shown equity will not intervene.10 7
Other provisions limit the temporary restraining order to five days, 0 3 a
temporary injunction to fifteen days and a permanent injunction to six
months.10 9 An extension of six months is permissible in the latter instance
upon a re-hearing. Provision is made also for the filing of adequate security
upon application for the order.'10 Where an injunction has been granted or
denied the appropriate appellate court must hear the case with the greatest
possible expedition."'
Conc asion
The antagonism which has surrounded the attitude of courts in respect of
the issuance of injunctions in labor cases is attributable largely to a mis-
application of long established rules of equity. Had the courts continued to
stress the fundamental elements of irreparable and substantial injury, and lack
of an adequate remedy at law, many injunctions would never have issued.
These fundamental requisites seem to have been grossly overlooked in the
desire of the courts to protect property rights. Thus a new body of equity
law applicable only to labor cases has been slowly formulated. This was
recognized when the labor injunction first achieved popularity and the statutes
attempting to restrict equity's powers have been little more than a codifica-
tion of the common law.1 2
107. This provision is embodied in § 7 of the Model Binl and is to be found in 47
STAT. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. § 108 (1934); Colo. Laws 1933, c. 59, § 7; Idaho Laws 1935, c.
215, § 7; LA. Gmz. STAT. (Dart, Supp. 1934) § 4379.11; MID. A,:. LAws (Bagby, Supp.
1935) tit. 100, § 68; Mhfss. ANN. LAws (Lawyer's Co-op, Supp. 1934) c. 214, § 9A (4)
as enacted by Laws 1935, c. 407; N. Y. CIv. PRAc. Acr (1935) § 876a (4); Ore. La.P
1933, c. 355, § 8; Utah Laws 1933, c. 15, § 7; WAsH. REV. STAr. Am. (Remington, Supp.
1935) § 7612-8; Wis. STAT. (1933) § 269.24. The Colorado statute provides that the court
need not wait for the determination of an arbitration board if irreparable injury is
threatened.
108. The life of the temporary restraining order as provided by the Minnesota statute
is 10 days. In Colorado, Louisiana and Utah, although granted for a 5-day period, it
may be renewed if the hearing has not been held. For a list of the statutes see note 71,
spra.
109. § 8 (a) (b) of the Model Bill.
The only state which has so far enacted limitations of the life of the temporary and
permanent injunctions is New York. N. Y. Crv. Piec. Acr (1935) § 876a (7) (8). The
life of the former is made 10 days, however.
110. See note 109, supra.
III. § 9 of the Model Bill, and provided in 47 STAT. 72, 29 U. S. C. A. § 110 (1934);
Colo. Laws 1933, c. 59, § 9; Idaho Laws 1933, c. 215, § 9; Ind. Laws 1933, c. 12, § 10;
LA. GbEN. STAT. (Dart, Supp. 1934) § 4379.13; AID. An,. LAxws (Bagby, Supp. 1935) art. IC0,
§ 73; MAss. AmN. LAws (Lawyer's Co-op., Supp. 1934) c. 214, § 9A (6) as enacted by
Laws 1935, c. 407; Minn. Laws 1933, c. 416, § 9; N. Y. Crv. PRAC. Acr (1935) § 876a (9);
N. D. Laws 1935, c. 247, § 9; Ore. Laws 1933, c. 355, § 10; Utah Laws 1933, c. 15, § 9;
WASm. REv. STAT. AiN. (Remington, Supp. 1935) § 7612-10; Wis. STAT. (1933) § 26S.26.
112. The Montana statute enacted in 1895 (MONT. RMv. CODE AN'21. [Choate, 1921]
§ 9242) provided that no injunction was to issue in "labor disputes under any other or
1936]
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The new legislation is in effect a declaration of the common law as applied
to equity cases outside the labor field. It requires irreparable and substan-
tial injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law before equity may
intervene.
It must be recognized that both the worker and the employer have well-de-
fined rights. True, they conflict and the complete enforcement of either must
inevitably work a gross injustice upon the other. Compromise is the only
satisfactory solution of such antagonistic rights. It is of no moment that
the developing rights of the laborer are of comparatively recent origin. Now
present, the law cannot remain oblivious to them. Seemingly the courts have
failed to adjust the equitable balance and in that failure lies the seed of the
new legislation.
THE SEAL IN PRESENT AMERICAN LA.-From a mere innocuous signet1 the
seal increased in influence like a malignant growth until it became a festering
sore on the body of the law requiring the operation of legislative enactment to
effect a cure. This development has been slow. In some of the. states in which
laws were passed for the purpose of reducing or eliminating the force of the seal,
conservative courts have refused to. interpret such enactments so as to accom-
plish the obvious legislative intent. In many states, the common law prevails
unmodified except in the few instances where an impatient judiciary of its own
accord has endeavored to overcome the potency of the seal. By a recent
amendment in New York 2 the seal is no longer to be received as any evidence
of consideration and a sealed instrument may be modified by an ordinary
writing.
Consideration
At common law, sealed obligations unlike other instruments required no con-
sideration for enforcement. 3 Thus, sealed agreements were unique, possessing
practical advantages over ordinary contracts. The reason for the sanctity en-
veloping the seal was the result of circumstances surrounding its inception at a
time when men, being unable to write, were generally identified by their seals.4
different circumstances or conditions than if the controversy were of another or different
character, or between parties neither or none of whom were laborers or interested in labor
questions."
1. Backus, The Origin and Use of Private Seals Under Common Law (1917) 51 AM. L.
Rzv. 369.
2. N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 708, § 1 amended § 342 of the Civil Practice Act to read as
follows:
§ 342. Seal on written instrument as evidence of consideration. A seal upon a written
instrument hereafter executed shall not be received as conclusive or presumptive evidence
of a sufficient consideration. A written instrument, hereafter executed, which modifies, varies
or cancels a sealed instrument, executed prior to the effective date of this section, shall not
be deemed invalid or ineffectual because of the absence of a seal thereon.
§ 2. This act shall take effect September first, nineteen hundred thirty-five.
3. HOLMES, THE ComoN LAW (1881) 134; 7 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENOLAND (2d ed. 1932)
§ 86; 1 Wn.UsToN, CONTRAcTs (1920) §§ 109, 217. A majority of the cases state that a
sealed instrument imports a consideration, but that is not a correct statement of the common
law. The correct statement is that a sealed instrument required no consideration. Ibid.
4. See Backus, loc. cit. supra note 1.
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Such implicit reliance was placed on the seal that persons were held bound by
documents to which their seals had been affixed without their consentYr 'ahle
the reasons for the rule dispensing with consideration for sealed instruments,
have long since disappeared, it still remains and is the law in a number of
states in actions both at law and equity.6
Dissatisfaction with the above rule induced legislative inroads into the con-
clusiveness of the seal.7 In Wisconsin,8 the seal is now only presumptive evi-
dence of consideration as to executory instruments. The MichiganO and
Oregon1 ° statutes making a seal only presumptive evidence of consideration
would seem to apply to all agreements, executed or executory. The courts
of New Jersey in interpreting a statute" similar to that of Michigan decided
by circuitous reasoning that it did not apply to releasesO nor to instruments in
situations where the parties never intended consideration to pass.1 3
The chief method of statutory attack upon the common law rule has been to
abolish the seal entirely. The statutes, in the main, state that the distinctions
between sealed and unsealed writings are abolished and that the addition of a
seal shall not affect the character or validity of the instrument in any manner. 14
Some of the enactments while abolishing private seals except those of corpora-
tions.15 In West Virginia the seal is abolished only as to writings conveying
or agreeing to transfer an interest in land.' 6
5. HoLt as, THE Commoy LAw (1831) 272; 9 HOLDSWORn, Hsrory or E-mrasrz LwtW
(1926) 157.
6. Curry v. Cotton, 356 Il. 538, 191 N. W. 307 (1934) (action to enforce provisions of
a joint will); Basketeria Stores, Inc. v. Public Indemnity Co., 204 N. C. 537, 165 S. E. 822
(1933); Bank of Charleston v. Oates, 160 S. C. 188, 158 S. E. 272 (1931) (foreclosure action) ;
see Florida Asphalt Pavement Mfg. Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 76 F. (2d) 326, 327 (C. C. A.
5th, 1935) (interpreting the Florida law); Newburyport Soc. for Relief of Aged Women
v. Noyes, 192 N: E. 54, 55 (Mass. 1934). Contra: Brown v. Nichols, 23 Ga. App. 569, 99
S. E. 57 (1919); Snyder v. Jones, 38 Md. 542 (1873) (equity will inquire into the true
consideration where the contract is still executory); see Branch v. Richmond Cold Storage
Co., 146 Va. 680, 689, 132 S. E. 848, 850 (1926).
7. In the development of legislation enacted, no attempt is being made to follow the
chronological order but rather classification is the aim.
8. Wis. STAT. (1933) § 328.27.
9. 1%icH. Comn. LAws (1929) § 14200. See Hobbs v. Electric Light Co., 75 Mich. 550,
553, 42 N. W. 965, 966 (1889) (intimating that under this statute a release under seal could
be attacked for lack of consideration).
10. Oa. CODE ANT. (1930) § 9-704.
11. N. J. Com. STAT. (1911) p. 2240.
12. Braden v. Ward, 42 N. J. L. 518 (Sup. Ct. 1880).
13. Aller v. Aller, 40 N. J. L. 446 (Sup. Ct. 1878).
14. ARx. CoNsr. (1874) sch. 1; CA.. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 1629; In.bUo COo
Aim.. (1932) § 28-108; IOWA CODE (1931) § 9439; Mo.,;T. REv. CODE Ai. (Choate, 1921)
§ 7524; NEB. Comor. STAT. (1929) § 76-256; N. D. Cow7. L.,ws A i. (1913) § 5894; Omo
Gm. CODE (Page, 1931) § 32; Onr.. STAT. ANN. (Harlow, 1931) § 9458; Uasr REv. STAT.
ANzx. (1933) § 104-48-4; WAsH. mrq. STAT. Axw. (Remington, 1932) § 10556.
15. ARiz. REv. CODE A..xN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 3048; Ku;. REv. ST,%T. Am.;. (1923)
§ 16-106; MmN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 6933; Mss. CODE Ax.N (1930) § 3302; Mo. STAT.
Arx. (Vernon, 1932) § 2957; N. Al. STAT. A.ar. (Courtright, 1929) § 117-105; TL-:.. CODE
(Harsh, 1932) § 7828; CoN -'s m Ta-_. STAT. (1928) art. 27; Wyo. Ray. STAT. A.:r.
(Courtright, 1931) § 97-122.
16. W. VA. CODE (1931) § 36-3-3.
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While the seal has not been abolished in New York and Alabama, its effect
insofar as consideration is concerned has been nullified. Under the Alabama
statute,'17 the consideration may be denied in the answer as though the instru-
ment were not sealed. This is an indirect way of meeting the situation for if
such a plea is not made the common law rule prevails. 18 Under the new
amendment in New York, a direct attack is used. A seal is no longer to be
received as conclusive or presumptive evidence of consideration,10 thus placing
the burden of pleading and of going forward with evidence of consideration on
the plaintiff.
The Kentucky statute" permits the consideration of any instrument, sealed
or unsealed, to be impeached by a verified answer. In Indiana 2 1 and Florida,22
an unsealed writing is given the force of one under seal only insofar as the
rules of evidence are concerned.
It would seem that in states where the seal has been abolished, even though
it be affixed to a writing, it should be disregarded and inquiry made as to the
real consideration.23 However, in spite of such a statute it has been held in
one instance that a seal still imported consideration.24 Under a similar statute
an even more startling conclusion was reached in Texas to the effect that any
written instrument implied a consideration. 25
While it is true that the seal has been abolished in some states, nevertheless
it had been too long implanted in the law not to have impressed itself upon
the minds of men. At the very moment when the seal was being removed from
the law-in certain instances in the same statute-any written contract was
made presumptive evidence of consideration.20 More than half the states which
17. ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 9461.
18. Johnson v. Caffey, 59 Ala. 331 (1877).
19. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT (1935) § 342.
20. Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 472. However, in the absence of such an answer It
seems that all instruments carry a presumption of consideration. Id. § 471; Bronston's;
Adm'r v. Lake, 135 Ky. 173, 121 S. W. 1021 (1909); Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v.
Hensley, 206 Ky. 202, 266 S. W. 1074 (1924) (both these cases held that under section 471
it is unnecessary to state the consideration when suing on a written instrument). Due to
the sweeping language of section 471 it might be that the attributes associated with a
sealed instrument may be given to a simple instrument.
21. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 2-1601.
22. FLA. CoMP. GEN. LAWS ANN. (1927) § 4330.
23. Luce v. Foster, 42 Neb. 818, 60 N. W. 1027 (1894) (parol evidence admitted to
show lack of consideration); see Mueninghaus v. James, 324 Mo. 767, 775, 24 S. W. (2d)
1017, 1020 (1930).
24. Monro v. National Surety Co., 47 Wash. 488, 92 Pac. 280 (1907).
25. Wright v. Robert & St. John Motor Co., 122 Tex. 278, 58 S. W. (2d) 67 (1933).
This conclusion was based on prior laws which the court held now became effective due
to the abolition of the seal.
26. ALA. CODE. ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 7662 (burden of proof on defendant when he
attacks the consideration by a plea); ARiz. REv. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 3048;
CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 1614; FLA. Cowx. GEN. LAws ANN. (1927) § 4330; ITAuo
CODE ANN. (1932) § 28-103; IOWA CODE (1931) § 9440; KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923)
§ 16-07; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. (Choate, 1921) § 7512; N. D. CoMP. LAws (1913) § 5881;
OLA. STAT. ANN. (Harlow, 1931) § 9449; TENN. CODE (Harsh, 1932) § 7829. Professor
Williston is opposed to this extension. 1 WILLiSTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 219.
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expressly nullified the force of the seal passed these contradictory enactments,
disclosing that the idea of some presumptive consideration inherent in the
seal was not removed but was in fact extended. The legislature of New Mexico
went even further by enacting that written instruments were to conclusively
import consideration in the same manner and as fully as sealed writings
formerly had.2 7
Thus the states are divided, in the main, into three groups: (1) those that
follow the common law wherein the seal is conclusive evidence of considera-
tion,28 (2) states which have abolished the seal but have provided that any
writing shall be presumptive evidence of consideration 2 9 and (3) states where-
in the seal is effectively eradicated and its influence terminated.30
Modification of Scaled Instruments
In the states which have not abolished the seal it is generally held that a
writing under seal cannot be modified by an executory contract not under
seal* However, these states have not gone so far as to require that the parties,
the unsealed compact having been executed, place each other in stalu quo.
The courts undoubtedly have felt that since it would be practically impossible
to effectuate a near-perfect return to statu. quo, the parol modification of the
sealed contract insofar as executed should be binding.32 They have preferred
to temper the rule with justice rather than carry it to a dryly logical con-
clusion.
A few states by statute have expressly made it possible to modify a sealed
document by parol.m Of the six states which have such laws, three have only
partly abolished the distinctions between sealed and unsealed agreements,3
while the other three have completely abolished such differencesP Other
27. N. M. STAT. AN-N. (1929) § 45-608.
28. See note 6, supra. The three states, Indiana, Florida, and New Mexico, which to
an extent have placed unsealed writings in a class with sealed writings may be included
in this group. See notes 21, 22, and 27, supra.
29. See note 26, supra. The states wherein the seal is only presumptive evidence of
consideration may be joined to this group. See notes 8, 9, and 10, supra.
30. See notes 14 and 15, supra. New York and Alabama have attacked the problem
of consideration without abolishing the seal so that the same result is achieved as in the
states which have abolished the seal. See notes 17 and 19, supra.
31. Cammack v. Slattery & Bro. Inc., 241 N. Y. 39, 148 N. E. 781 (1925); Colodny v.
American Clothing Co. Inc., 178 AUt. 714 (Vt. 1935); see Lanum v. Harrington, 267 Ill.
57, 63, 107 N. E. 826, 828 (1915); Sachs v. Owings, 121 Va. 162, 171, 92 S. E. 997, I000
(1917). Contra: Myers v. Ohio-Penn Gas & Oil Co., 294 Pa. 212, 144 AU. 93 (1928);
Koth v. County Bd. of Ed. of Jasper County, 141 S. C. 448, 140 S. E. 99 (1927).
32. Jones & Dommersnas Co. v. Crary, 234 I1. 26, 84 N. E. 651 (190); Harris v.
Shorall, 230 N. Y. 343, 130 N. E. 372 (1921) (specific performance granted vendor even
though the parol modification of the sealed contract had been executed only by him); se
Cammack v. Slattery & Bro. Inc., 241 N. Y. 39, 45, 148 N. E. 781, 782 (1925).
33. CAL. CoD or Crv. PRoc. (Deering, 1931) § 1932; Izv. STAT. Am;. (Burns, 1933)
§ 2-1601 (instruments relating to an interest in land excepted); Mo,-. Rnv. CoDz Amr.
(Choate, 1921) § 10580; N.Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr (1935) § 342; OaR. CoDE A; . (1930) § 9-704;
Wyo. Rnv. STAT. AmN. (Courtright, 1931) § 97-123.
34. Indiana, New York and Oregon.
35. California, Montana and Wyoming.
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states, which have completely annulled the effect of the seal, proceed on the
theory that since all contracts have been placed on the same level, this without
more should be sufficient to permit modification of a sealed agreement by an
unsealed one.
Principal and Agent
(a) Principal disclosed: At common law in order that an agent might bind
his principal on a sealed contract, his authority was required to be of equal
dignity.3 6 To permit a party to escape liability on this ground, when his
agent having power to contract enters into a sealed agreement, is most unjust.
Especially is this true where the seal is not requisite to the validity of the
instrument. Therefore, most courts in the latter situation have disregarded
the seal and held the principal liable on a simple contract. 7  This is one of
the instances where the judiciary, of its own accord, has limited the effect of
the seal.
(b) Principal undisclosed: Few more obsolete and unjust rules exist than
those relating to undisclosed principals. A mere seal often sets up an im-
penetrable barrier behind which the undisclosed principal can act with im-
punity, free from any legal liability.38 While he cannot sue"9 or be sued on
such contract, his agent can maintain an action on the agreement4" and the
undisclosed principal eventually obtains the benefits therefrom. Thus, the
principal suffers no disadvantage by being unable to sue on the contract.
Where the undisclosed principal has received the benefits of the contract,
the courts have been prone to hold him answerable. In some instances, a re-
covery is allowed on the contract,41 while in others suit is brought in quasi-
contract.42  In those states which have abolished the seal, it would seem to
follow that an action can be maintained on the contract.48 Maryland, by
36. Radcliffe v. Jones, 46 Ga. App. 33, 166 S. E. 450 (1932); see Crane, The Magic
of the Private Seal (1915) 15 CoL. L. REV. 24, 28.
37. Alfano v. Donnelly, 285 Mass. 554, 189 N. E. 610 (1934); Wood v. Wise, 153 App.
Div. 223, 137 N. Y. Supp. 1017 (2d Dep't 1912), aff'd, 208 N. Y. 586, 102 N. E. 1117 (1913).
But see Featherstone v. Reese, 36 Ga. App. 379, 136 S. E. 811, 813 (1926) (even
though seal not required, if instrument be under seal, agent's authority must also be under
seal).
38. Starita Co. v. Compagnie Havrise Peninsulaire, 52 F. (2d) 58 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931);
Seretto v. Schell, 247 Mass. 173, 141 N. E. 871 (1923) (action for specific performance);
Crowley v. Lewis, 239 N. Y. 264, 146 N. E. 374 (1925) (action for specific performance);
see 2 MECEMM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 1734; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 191.
39. See Gibson v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 232 Fed. 225, 228 (D. C. N. J. 1916);
Gardner v. Shekleton, 253 Ill. App. 333, 337 (1929); RESTATEMENT, AmcCY (1933) § 303 (a).
40. Id. § 296 (b).
41. Kirschbon v. Bonzel, 67 Wis. 178, 29 N. W. 907 (1886); see Ottman v. Nixon-
Nirdlinger, 301 Pa. 234, 242, 151 AtI. 879, 881 (1930).
42. Moore v. Granby Mining & Smelting Co., 80 Mo. 86 (1883); Donner v. Whitecotton,
201 Mo. App. 443, 212 S. W. 378 (1919). The seal had been abolished at this time yet
the court held that the undisclosed principal on a warranty deed was not liable for breach
of covenant in an action on the deed itself, but could be sued in quasi-contract.
43. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp. v. Bennett, 73 F. (2d) 387 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934);
Streeter Jr. Co. v. Janu, 90 Minn. 393, 96 N. W. 1128 (1903); Efta v. Swanson, 115 Minn.
373, 132 N. W. 335 (1911) (undisclosed principal liable); McLeod v. Morrison & Eshelman,
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statute,4 has settled the matter effectively by providing that anyone entitled to
sue or be sued on the instrument but for such seal shall have such right even
though a seal be affixed.
In New York an interesting history surrounds this problem. In spite of
decisions to the contrary, specific performance has been granted in favor of 4s
as well as against4 6 an undisclosed principal. In Lagurnis v. Gerard 7 it was
stated that since the Court of Appeals had indicated that an undisclosed
principal should be permitted to sue on a sealed contract, effect should be
given to such pronouncement. However when the Court of Appeals was con-
fronted directly with the question it held to the contrary 8 The court did
intimate that had the undisclosed principal received benefits under the contract,
he might have been held liable.4 9 Subsequently this dictunt met with dis-
approval in the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court.P0 Thus the conflict and
uncertainty of the law in this particular matter is apparent.
It seems that the recent amendment to Section 342 of the New York Civil
Practice Act will add to the confusion. It provides that a sealed instrument can
be effectively modified by one not under seal. Suppose this to occur, would it
permit a suit against an undisclosed principal on the basis of the modifying
agreement which is not under seal? The difficulty of solution mounts when
coupled with the fact that the modifying agreement is often unintelligible ex-
cept when read in conjunction with the original contract.
Release
One salutary aspect of the seal lay in the fact that it provided a simple
method for permanently ending litigation and settling disputes. Consideration
not being required for a release under seal, such an instrument was, in the
66 Wash. 683, 120 Pac. 528 (1912) (action for specific performance); cf. Donner v. White-
cotton, 201 Mo. App. 443, 212 S. W. 378 (1919), cited note 42, supra. Contra: Lading v.
Dean, 129 Kan. 636, 284 Pac. 369 (1930) (no action maintainable against undisclo-ed
principal).
44. MI. Asarm. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 75 § 15. This is the only statute of its kind.
45. Lagumis v. Gerard, 116 Misc. 471, 190 N. Y. Supp. 207 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
46. Van Ingen v. Belmont, 121 Misc. 109, 200 N. Y. Supp. 847 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Diamond
v. Talbot, 123 Misc. 339, 205 N. Y. Supp. 309 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
47. 116 Misc. 471, 190 N. Y. Supp. 207 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
48. Crowley v. Lewis, 239 N. Y. 246, 146 N. E. 374 (1925).
49. An earlier Appellate Division case specifically laid down a contrary ruling. Klein v.
Mechanics & Traders Bank, 145 App. Div. 615, 130 N. Y. Supp. 436 (2d Dep't 1911).
50. Owners' Holding Corp. v. Kissing, 128 Misc. 14, 15, 217 N. Y. Supp. 189, 189 (Sup.
Ct. 1926): "In view of that decision [Crowley v. Lewis] we have concluded that the
presence of a seal prevents suit against a principal not named in a sealed instrument, whether
such principal simply authorizes the execution of the instrument by his agent or both
authorizes the execution and accepts the benefits thereof, or ratifies the execution and
accepts the benefits of such instrument." It is of interest to note that Justice Crop-ey, who
wrote the opinion in Lagumis v. Gerard, was one of the members of this court. Apparently
having once unsuccessfully attempted to fathom dictum and predict law, he refused to do so
again.
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absence of fraud, conclusive against the party giving it,51 while a release not
under seal could be attacked for want of consideration.
52
It would seem therefore, that the effect of the seal at common law might
well be retained with respect to releases. In states where the seal has been
abolished, a release has been successfully attacked for lack of consideration."5
This defect has been recognized in a number of states which have passed laws
specifically making releases conclusively binding as though under seal at
common law.54 It would seem that the New York statute"5 by removing the
conclusiveness of the seal has made it impossible to give a release that is not
open to attack for want of consideration. 56
Statute of Limitations
The period of limitation for sealed instruments has always exceeded that
of simple contracts.5" This was true though the instrument required no seal
for its validity.55 A number of states have enacted laws providing for longer
periods of limitation for sealed than for unsealed instruments." The general
trend seems to be toward a twenty year limitation period as regards specialties,
but the period has been set as low as eight years.6 0
Statutes abolishing the s eal would seem to have done away with the varying
periods of limitation for sealed and unsealed contracts.01 None of the states
which have abolished the seal have enacted laws providing in any way for
longer periods within which to commence actions. The recent amendment to
Section 342 of the New York Civil Practice Act would not seem to have af-
fected the limitation period for a sealed instrument.
51. Cairo R. R. v. United States, 267 U. S. 350 (1925) ; Hogan v. Producers' Development
Co., 200 App. Div. 29, 192 N. Y. Supp. 337 (1st Dep't 1922); see Commercial Bank v. Mc-
Cormick, 97 Md. 703, 709, 55 Atl. 439, 441 (1903).
52. Insurance Co. v. Cohen, 138 Va. 177, 121 S. E. 507 (1924).
53. Williams v. Blumenthal, 27 Wash. 24, 67 Pac. 393 (1901); see Judd v. Walker, 158
Mo. App. 156, 164, 138 S. W. 655, 658 (1911); 3 WnusToN, CONTRACTs (1920) § 1822;
cf. Olston v. Oregon Water Power & Ry. Co., 52 Ore. 343, 96 Pac. 1095 (1908).
54. CAL. CODE OF CIV. PRoC. (Deering, 1931) § 1934; CAL. CIV. CODE (Deerlng, 1931)
§ 1541; IND. STAT. ANr. (Burns, 1933) § 2-1601; MONT. REv. CODE ANN. (Choate, 1921),
§ 10582; N. D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. (1913) § 5835; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 9-706; TENN.
CODE (Harsh, 1932) § 9741; Wyo. Ray. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1931) § 97-123.
55. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT (1935) § 342.
56. N. Y. L. J., Sept. 11, 1935, at 720. Letter from Win. Brady, Jr.
57. See 3 Wmr isToN, CONTRACTS (1920) § 2001.
58. Conowingo Land Co. v. McGaw, 124 Md. 643, 93 Atl. 222 (1915).
59. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 6003; GA. CODE (1933) § 3-703; MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932)
c. 260, § 1; N. C. CODE ANN. (1927) § 437; N. HAmP. PUB. LAWs (1926) c. 329 § 4; S. C.
CODE (1932) § 387; VT. PuB. LAWS (1933) § 1645.
60. Ibid.
61. Contra: Gibson v. Allen, 19 S. D. 617, 104 N. W. 275 (1905) (20 years still the limita-
tion period on sealed agreements; his conclusion was reached because of another statute
which was interpreted so as to exclude the effect of the abolition of the seal in this one respect).
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Conckusion
Though there have been sweeping statements to the effect that the seal
has outlived its usefulness and that the legislatures should provide for its com-
plete eradication, 62 nevertheless on close consideration this viewpoint cannot
meet with wholehearted approval. There would seem to be little doubt that
some of the features of the seal concept should be discarded. The question is-
which features shall be eliminated and which retained?
The total elimination of the seal would satisfactorily settle the problems
created with relation to consideration, modification of contracts, and the
principal-agent relationship. Unfortunately, at the same time, the conclusive-
ness of a sealed release at common law would be destroyed, and the Statute of
Limitations on all contract actions would be the same. It should be possible
definitely and conclusively to end litigation and disputes. A statute stating
that any instrument which purports to be a release shall have the same force
and effect as a sealed release at common law, would appear to be a sufficient
remedy. Likewise, it might be beneficial to allow for a somewhat enlarged
period within which to commence an action. An enactment providing that all
actions on contract or other agreement must be commenced within six years
with the exception that the parties may specifically provide, either in the
agreement or elsewhere, that the period of limitations be extended, would
allow for any deficiency caused by the abolition of the seal and would permit
the parties more fully to determine their rights.
The study of the seal and its operation, in spite of all legislative inroads, is
not a mere academic subject but one of practical importance. The seal in
many states still exerts a force both in the fields of substantive and adjective
law. If there is an urge in such states to reduce the influence of the seal, the
extent to which it should continue to be a factor in the law should be deter-
mined beforehand, and statutes enacted in accordance therewith. Piecemeal
legislation of the type recently enacted in New York, should if possible be
avoided since frequently the only result is confusion. The Law Revision Com-
mission in New York is making a study of the effect of the seales and it is to
62. CARDozo, NATuRE or THE JuDicin PRocEss (1921) 155; Comment (1925) 34 YA=r
L. J. 782. But see Extract from Report of Com. on Lcgislaltion of Mass. Bar. Asso. (1928)
13 MuAsS. L. QUART. no. 3.
63. A tentative report has already been submitted in mimeograph form to the Bar As-
sociations of the State. See RxcoamnzDATzoNs or m LAw REVoN, Cojemmsso,; To Tm
LEGIsLATuE RELA=rnG TO TIE SEAM AND CoNsmDAToN (1935).
This preliminary report makes the following proposals to remedy defects created by the
recent amendment to Section 342 of the Civil Practice Act:
(1) The Commission advises a new Section 33b of the Personal Property Law which
would eliminate the present distinctions as to rights and liabilities of undisclosed principals
on sealed and simple contracts.
(2) The Commission being of the opinion that it is no longer pocsble to give a binding
release without consideration (see note 55, supra), a new Section 33a of the Personal
Property Law is submitted to remedy this condition.
(3) It suggests that Section 342, taken literally, applies only to sealed instruments ex-
ecuted prior to September 1, 1935. To correct this obvious defect, the Commission proposes
an amendment eliminating the clause "executed prior to the effective date of this section."
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be hoped that the Commission will make a series of recommendations to the
end of clarifying the law in this state, and perhaps leading to an era of legis-
lative activity wherein instead of blindly abolishing the seal, it will be given
proper evaluation, the good aspects retained and the bad features discarded.
(4) A sentence is also added to the above section of the Civil Practice Act clarifying
the idea that only a written, executory instrument can modify a sealed agreement and that
this relaxation of the common law does not extend to oral, executory modifications.
The Commission is still studying other problems involving the seal and will report on
them at some future date.
